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1 Introduction 
In the last 20 years there has been a wave of reforms in the electricity sector, in particular,
in its distribution activity, seeking to improve efficiency and to transfer the productivity
gains to consumers. However, there are striking differences in the policies that have been
implemented world-wide. While several regulators have adopted incentive regulation,
some countries rely on competition policy alone and in others no regulation is applied.
Sometimes competition for consumers is allowed whereas in other cases each distribution
company has its captive consumers. While privatisation has accompanied the reforms in
several countries, public ownership remains in others. The question that arises is which
types of policies lead to efficiency improvements. This paper provides an empirical
examination of this issue. 
Economic theory provides arguments of the policies´ effect on the achievement of
efficiency. Failure to achieve the efficiency frontier can be explained by the existence of
X-inefficiency. X-inefficiency arises in the context of asymmetric information. In such
cases managerial slack can occur, that is, the manager may exert low level of effort to
reduce costs. Many mechanisms can help reducing managerial slack. First, several
authors argue that the pressures of competition lead to efforts toward cost reduction. One
explanation is the lesser discretion held by the managers in a competitive environment.
The risk of a bankruptcy, which is greater in a competitive environment, is also a
disciplining device. In addition, the positive effect of competition on reducing managerial
slack might derive from the possibility of yardstick competition. Tirole (1997), Vickers
(1995) and Meyer and Vickers (1997) agree that yardstick competition is more useful in
industries with competition than in monopolies because the exogenous conditions facing
firms are more likely to be correlated when these firms are in the same product market.
Second, the threat of a takeover also serves as a mechanism to discipline managers. This
threat is stronger with private capital. With a public enterprise there are fewer feasible
mechanism by which the ownership of the firm can be transferred. Finally, the regulatory
regimes have different incentives properties. The economic theory indicates that incentive
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regulation such as yardstick competition gives incentives to firms to reduce costs by
rewarding their good performance in comparison with a benchmark performance. 
This paper tests whether electricity distribution firms operating in a competitive
environment, with private ownership of the capital and where incentive regulation has
been adopted are more productively efficient.1 This is the first attempt to do this. There
are no previous empirical studies which evaluate the effect of these three characteristics
on efficiency. To test this I use a sample of 56 electricity distribution firms from
Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom and from 10 Latin American countries in the
year 2000. I apply several benchmarking techniques to this sample. I test the robustness
of my results using parametric techniques, such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and non-parametric techniques such as Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
In applying benchmarking techniques to test the hypothesis I can identify which
companies perform better than others. Indeed, these techniques are used by some
regulators to overcome informational asymmetries. The regulator does not know if the
regulated firm is productively efficient due to his lack of information regarding the
efficient cost level but through the application of benchmarking techniques the
informational gap is reduced by relying on performance rankings based on comparative
efficiency measures. 
The results confirm the view that a higher competition is related with lower costs. In
addition, firms where incentive regulation has been adopted and firms which rely on
competition policy have lower distribution costs. But, contrary to the theoretical
literature, the results indicate that public firms perform better than private firms.
                                                          
1 A firm is productively or technically efficient if it produces an amount of output using the minimum level
of inputs or if it produces the maximum amount of output given a level of inputs.
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The study is structured in the following way. Section 2 describes the methodology
employed. An outline of selected previous empirical studies is presented in Section 3.
Section 4 provides a description of the data used, testing the existence of outliers and
analysing the characteristics of the countries studied. Section 5 presents the models.
Then, Section 6 presents the results obtained with the different techniques: ratio analysis,
regression analysis and DEA and evaluates the consistency of the results. Finally, the
conclusions are presented in Section 7.
2 Benchmarking methodology
The performance of a firm in transforming the inputs into outputs can be measured by
productivity ratios. These ratios are partial productivity measures. When a firm delivers a
range of services or outputs using a number of inputs, these partial measures are not
useful to rank the performance of the firms. In order to assess the firms’ productivity, a
comprehensive measure of economic performance is required. 
Benchmarking methodology allows comparing the performance of different firms and
assessing their potential efficiency improvements. The traditional methodology to
measure efficiency is the standard econometric approach, OLS. Since the seminal paper
of Farrell (1957), who followed the work of Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951), new
methodologies have been developed. The new techniques include the estimation of
production or cost frontiers either using a mathematical programming approach (DEA) or
an econometric approach (SFA). The three techniques are used in the present paper in
order to evaluate the robustness of the results. 
Frontier techniques measure the efficiency relative to the best practice in the sample.
Instead, standard regression analysis (OLS) provides measures of efficiency against the
average practice in the sample. Both OLS and SFA techniques require specifying a
functional form and assuming a distribution of the disturbance errors. They allow
identifying the importance of the cost drivers and the goodness of fit. One of the main
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problems with OLS method is that it assumes that the whole residual is attributed to
inefficiency (or efficiency). Instead, SFA models incorporate the possibility that some
component of the residual may result from measurement errors or from the omission of
explanatory variables. In these models the error term has two components: one to account
for random effects (v) and another to account for technical inefficiency (u). 
The non–parametric approach to frontier estimation proposed by Farrell (1957) was
reformulated as a mathematical programming problem by Charnes et al (1978), giving
rise to the DEA approach. DEA simultaneously models the interaction between multiple
inputs used and outputs produced. This implies that substitution possibilities are
explicitly considered. It uses a linear programming method to construct a non-parametric
piecewise linear frontier over the data. One of the main advantages of this technique is
that it does not require specifying a functional form. However, DEA has some
drawbacks. It is a deterministic rather than a statistical technique. As a result, there is no
information about statistical significance or confidence intervals. Its reliance on a few
observations also implies that the efficiency scores are sensitive to outliers which can
distort the efficient frontier. 
DEA allows accounting for operating environment characteristics that influence the firm
efficiency but are outside the control of the manager such as consumers’ characteristics,
consumers’ density, weather conditions, etc. This can be done by directly including the
environment variables in the DEA model or by conducting a second stage estimation2. 
3 Previous empirical studies
A number of empirical studies have applied benchmarking techniques to assess the
relative efficiency of electricity distribution companies. This section outlines some of
them, which are of interest for the present study. Whilst benchmarking techniques are
                                                          
2 For a review of the different techniques see Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998).
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applied by regulators in some countries3, the most relevant studies, which I will
summarise below, are those that perform international comparisons or address questions
similar to the one proposed here. 
International comparisons have been performed by a few numbers of studies. Jamasb and
Pollitt (2001) analyse 63 firms from 6 European countries for 1997-98. The authors find
that the efficient frontiers tend to be dominated by smaller utilities than the UK firms.
Rossi and Ruzzier (2001) and Estache et al (2002) perform international comparisons for
several firms from South American countries. Both studies apply DEA and SFA
techniques and find that the different approaches are consistent in their means, rankings,
identification of the best and worst performers and that the efficiency scores are stable
over time. 
Several studies have analysed the effects of public and private ownership on the
efficiency of electricity distribution firms. The results are not conclusive about the effect
of ownership. On one hand, Neuberg (1977) estimates a cost function for distribution
firms in US in the year 1972. The author finds no empirical evidence to support the claim
that the privately owned firms are more cost efficient than publicly owned firms. Pollitt
(1995) applies DEA and estimates a cost function for a sample of 136 US firms and nine
UK firms in the year 1990. The author does not find strong evidence that ownership
affects performance of utilities.4 Scarsi (1999) studies 76 Italian firms: 37 municipal
firms and 39 ENEL (the Italian electricity monopolist) zones. The author finds no
statistically significant differences between privately and publicly owned firms. On the
other hand, Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998) in a study of the Swedish distribution
                                                          
3 For instance, the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) commissioned London
Economics (1999) to measure the technical efficiency of the New South Wales (NSW) distribution
companies. In the Netherlands, DTe (2002) uses DEA to evaluate the relative performance of the electricity
distribution companies. Ofgem (1999) uses Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) to measure the
relative efficiency of the 14 United Kingdom (UK) electricity distribution firms in 1997-98.
4 With the cost function estimation, he finds a negative coefficient on the ownership dummy, indicating
lower costs in public firms but the coefficient is not statistically significant. With the DEA estimation, the
author finds that the public firms outperform the private ones but the null hypothesis of no difference
between ownership types cannot be rejected.
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utilities in the period 1970-1990, find that the private firms are relatively more efficient
than the public firms. 
Regarding the effect of the regulatory method employed, Hattori et al (2002) examine the
relative performance of price cap versus rate of return regulation. The sample comprises
twelve UK distribution firms and ten Japanese distribution firms in the period 1985-1998.
The results indicate that, in most cases, the UK electricity distribution utilities have
performed better than the Japanese electricity distribution. The performance gap is
particularly evident during the last three years of the sample when UK electricity
distribution companies operate under a price cap while Japanese firms operate within a
rate of return regulation regime. 
4 Data 
4.1 Data description
i) The sample and its sources
The sample includes 56 electricity distribution companies spread in 12 countries:
Australia, New South Wales (NSW) (5), New Zealand (22), Argentina (2), Bolivia (2),
Brazil (3), Chile (1), Colombia (1), Mexico (1), Paraguay (1), Peru (3), UK (13) Uruguay
(1) and Venezuela (1). A list with the names of the firms is provided in Annex B. The
data employed correspond to the year 2000.5 
ii) Definition of outputs and inputs
                                                          
5 The data are obtained from the following sources: i) Australia: from the IPART publication “Price and
service report for 2000/01. NSW Distribution Network Service Providers” ii) New Zealand: from the
Information Disclosure, information that the firms must provide according to electricity regulation in 1994,
Electric Act 1992, section 170 iii) South American firms: from the “Comisión de Integración Energética
Regional” (CIER) publication “Informe Económico Técnico de las Empresas Eléctricas y de Tarifas
Eléctricas en los países de la CIER” (2000), iv) Mexico: from the regulator, Comisión Reguladora de
Energía (CRE) and v) UK: from the Ofgem publication “Reviews of Public Electricity Suppliers 1998-
2000–Final  Proposals”.   
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In order to measure the efficiency of the firm, a cost function characteristic of the
industry is defined. The outputs defined in this study are: number of consumers (000’s),
energy delivered (GWh) and network length (Km). The input defined is operating costs
(million of US$ adjusted by PPP). 
The number of consumers represents the number of connection points supplied. The
energy delivered reflects the capacity requirements of the distribution system. The length
of the network is considered an output because it is a proxy for the dispersion of the
consumers. In addition, an aggregate output is calculated following the methodology
employed by the Ofgem in the 1999 Distribution Price Control Review. A composite
variable is constructed, attaching a weight of 0.5 on number of consumers and 0.25 on
both, energy delivered and network length. The construction of this aggregate output is
made to adjust the number of consumers (adcons) for each firm so that the differences in
energy delivered per consumer and length of line per consumer are accounted for6.
The input considered is operating costs, which include costs of operation and
maintenance, commercialisation costs and administrative costs. For the vertically
integrated firms, the costs correspond only to distribution and commercialisation
activities plus a fraction of administrative costs. In order to determine this fraction, the
weight of distribution and commercialisation costs in the total cost is used7. The
operating costs are in million of dollars and adjusted using the Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) factors, obtained from the World Bank. 
In addition, environmental variables are used in order to assess the effect of the existence
of competition, of the private or public firm’s ownership and of the regulatory method
applied. These environmental variables are dummy variables, which are described in
section 4.3.
                                                          
6 See Ofgem (May, 1999).
7 This is a common practice. For example, Hattori et al (2002) use the weight of labour costs to calculate
the fraction of general and administration costs attributable to the distribution activity for the Japanese
companies.  
Regulation, competition and ownership in electricity distribution companies: the effects on efficiency
Luciana Macedo Saravia
9
iii) Limitations
Most of the data is obtained from the regulators. This gives some reassurance in the sense
that the data is verified. But, the firms may practice gaming such as distorting the data
provided to regulators. The other important source is the CIER, a regional organism
which collects data from several Latin American countries, constructing a homogeneous
database. This also gives some reassurance regarding the verification and comparability
of the data. Yet, there is no information on the differences in data accountability between
all the countries. Therefore, it is important to be cautious with the results since
differences in accountability can affect them. 
Another aspect which is not considered is the development of no regulated activities by
the firms. If the firm is allowed to perform other activities, sharing costs with the
distribution activity, these costs should be deducted from the distribution costs and thus
the firm should be more efficient. The existence of these activities and the effect on
efficiency is not studied.  
4.2 Descriptive statistics
In order to test the existence of outliers in the sample, descriptive statistics and
relationships between variables are analysed. In fact, two outliers are detected by
observing the relationship between operating costs adjusted by PPP and consumers.
Annex A presents two graphics where the presence of the outliers is detected8. 
Descriptive statistics such as the mean, the standard deviation, the maximum and the
minimum are calculated for the whole sample (56 firms) and for the sample excluding the
two outliers. These tables are presented in Annex A. Comparing both tables it is possible
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to observe the important differences between the mean, the standard deviation and the
maximum of each variable. In conclusion, the two outliers, which are CEMIG (Brazil)
and CFE (Mexico) are excluded from the sample. 
4.3 Analysis of countries
The electricity sectors of the countries considered have different characteristics which can
influence the level of productive efficiency of their firms. The countries are classified
according to the existence or not of competition at the distribution level in the electricity
sector, according to the type of ownership (private or public) and to the type of regulation
applied.  
i) Competition 
In a full retail competition model there is competition at the distribution level because all
customers can choose their suppliers, i.e. consumers either have direct access to
competing generators or through their choice of retailer. The distributors compete as
retailers. The countries with competition at the distribution level include Australia,
Brazil, Colombia, New Zealand and UK9. In the other countries the distributors maintain
a monopoly over energy sales to the final consumers. They each have a franchise to serve
a given set of captive customers. Among these countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Two dummy variables are created to
account for the effect of competition on efficiency. C0 is 1 when there is no competition
while C1 is 1 when there is competition at the distribution level.
ii) Capital ownership
                                                                                                                                                                            
8 The first graph presents the relationship between operating costs adjusted by PPP and consumers when the
whole sample is considered, observing that two firms are much bigger than the rest. The second graph
presents the same relationship when these two firms are excluded. 
9 In Australia, New Zealand and UK there is full retail competition. In Colombia, distributors compete in
each zone because they do not have a license to supply a given set of consumers. In Brazil in the largest
distribution areas there are distinct licenses that are allowed to compete. 
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Regarding the capital ownership, private capital dominates in some countries such as UK,
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. In other countries such as Australia, Mexico, Paraguay
and Uruguay the capital at the distribution level is entirely public. In the rest of the
countries there is a mixture of private and public capital. Two dummy variables are
created to assess the effect of the ownership on efficiency. O0 is 1 in the case of a firm
with public ownership and O1 is 1 in the case of a firm with private ownership.
iii) Regulatory method
Regarding the regulatory method, the countries can be classified into four categories: 1)
countries which use benchmarking approaches, 2) countries which apply some type of
price cap, 3) countries which rely on competition law and 4) countries which do not have
regulation. These categories reflect the degree of incentives given to firms to reduce
costs. The first category implies the strongest incentives to cost reductions while the last
implies no incentives. In the first group are Australia, Chile, Peru and UK. Australia
applies a revenue cap while UK uses a price cap. Both adjust by factor X and use
benchmarking techniques to evaluate the scope for cost reduction. In Chile and Peru the
distribution companies compete with a reference efficient model firm. The second group
includes Argentina10, Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia, where price caps are applied. Third,
in New Zealand the electricity sector has to comply with competition law. The last group
includes Paraguay (where there is no regulation) and countries where there is now some
type of regulation but this is not reflected in the data used in the present study. These
countries are Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela11. 
                                                          
10 In Argentina auctions are combined with a price cap. Distribution companies operate under a 95-year
concession contract, which is broken into nine 10-year management periods. Before the start of each
period, the regulator sets the tariffs to be applied during that period and calls for a competitive auction for
control of the company. 
11 In Mexico distribution prices will be regulated using a price cap regime (Inter American Development
Bank, 1999). In Uruguay the new regulatory framework provides a tariff regime based on an efficient
model firm. In Venezuela the Comision Nacional de Energia Electrica (CNEE), created by the 1999 Law,
will establish the principles, methodologies and models that will define the tariff regime (Inter American
Development Bank, 1999).
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According to the strength of the incentives given by the regulatory method, four dummy
variables are created to assess the effect of the regulatory method on the efficiency. D3 is
1 when the firm has the strongest incentives through the use of benchmarking techniques.
D2 is 1 when the firm applies price cap regulation. D1 is 1 when competition law is
applied. D0 is 1 when there is no regulation. Annex B provides a table summarising the
dummy variables for each company. 
5 Models 
For the estimations the two outliers detected are excluded from the sample. Thus, the
number of observations is 54. The correlation matrix is calculated, finding that energy
delivered and consumers are highly correlated (0.94). This could have negative
consequences in the estimations, resulting in multicolinearity. Thus, energy and
consumers are not included together in the estimations.
5.1 Ordinary Least Squares
i) Model
First, a basic log-linear model is estimated. The equation estimated is the following:
Niellineslconsumerstsl iiii ,...1cos 210 =+++= βββ
The dependent variable is the logarithm of operating costs adjusted by PPP. The variable
lconsumers is the number of consumers in logs and llines is the length of the network in
logs. N is the number of firms in the sample. This model is called OLS–1LL. Variants of
this model are also estimated. A model replacing consumers with energy delivered is
estimated (OLS–2LL) and a model excluding the variable lines (OLS–3LL). 
Second, a model with the aggregate output as cost driver is estimated (OLS–4 LL): 
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Nieladconstsl iii ,...1cos 10 =++= ββ
where ladcons is the adjusted number of consumers in logs and represents the aggregate
output. The same equations are estimated with variables in levels.12
 
ii) Effect of regulation, competition and ownership
To assess the effect of regulatory method, competition and ownership on efficiency,
dummy variables are included in the previous regressions. For example, the following
model is estimated.
iiii eOCDDDllineslconsumerstsl ++++++++= 11310cos 76543210 ββββββββ
where D0 is 1 when the firm is not regulated, D1 is 1 when the firm complies with
competition law and D3 is 1 when the firm has the strongest incentives (benchmarking
techniques). The dummy variable D2 is equal to 1 when the regulatory method provides
some incentives for cost reduction (price cap regime). C1 indicates competition at the
distribution level. The variable C0 is equal to 1 when there is no competition. O1
indicates private ownership while O0 accounts for public ownership. In each group of
dummies, one dummy variable is excluded to avoid multicolinearity. This model is called
OLS–5LL. The model is also estimated using the composite output (OLS–6LL).
5.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis
i) Model
The estimation of a cost function is considered more appropriate than the estimation of a
production function because the output is exogenous for each firm given the universal
                                                          
12 The software used is LIMDEP version 7.0.
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service obligation. Input prices are needed in order to estimate a cost function. Wages in
manufacturing are used as a proxy for the labour cost. The information is obtained from
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for all the countries except for Uruguay. For
this country the information is obtained from the National Institute of Statistics in
Uruguay13,14. Since capital is a tradeable input, its price is assumed to be equal across all
countries and is not included in the regression.
The specification chosen is that of Battese and Coelli (1995). In this specification the
error term iu  which accounts for technical inefficiency is expressed as an explicit
function of a vector of firm-specific variables and a random error. Thus, this model
allows explicitly including dummy variables to investigate the determinants of the
inefficiencies. The model estimated is the following:
iiiiii uvlwllineslconsumerstsl +++++= 3210cos ββββ
where the variable lcosts is the log of the operating costs in millions of dollars and lw is
the log of manufacturing wages. iv is a random variable which is assumed to be iid.
( )2,0 VN σ  and independent of iu , which is a non-negative random variable that accounts
for technical inefficiency. iu  is assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at
zero of the ( )2, UitmN σ  distribution, where δitit zm = . z represents the firm-specific
variables. In the present case, 
11310 543210 OCDDDmi δδδδδδ +++++=
where the dummy variables are the same as defined in the OLS estimation. This model is
called SFA–1LL. Alternatively, the cost function is estimated using the composite output
                                                          
13 A different source of information is used for Uruguay because the information available at the ILO for
this country are indices and not monetary values. 
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as explanatory variable (SFA–2LL). The same equations are estimated using a
translogarithmic specification (SFA–1TL and SFA–2TL).15 
5.3 Data Envelopment Analysis
The three outputs defined (energy delivered, consumers and network length) are
employed16. The input used is operating costs adjusted by PPP. Two specifications, which
represent the underlying technology, are estimated: Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) and
Variable Returns to Scale (VRS). The input orientation is chosen. This option is more
appropriate when the firms provide a public service because they have an obligation to
supply the demand.17 
Although environment factors which account for density are not directly included in DEA
estimation, the DEA scores adjust for customer density and for load density in the model
specification. In fact, the customer density is considered because firms with relatively
similar mixes of operating costs per network kilometre are compared. Load density is
considered through the comparison of firms with relatively similar mixes of energy
(GWh) per consumer.
5.3.1 Two-stage DEA
To investigate the determinants of efficiency, a regression is estimated in a second stage.
Following the procedure suggested by Coelli et al (1998), the efficiency scores obtained
in the DEA estimation are regressed against dummy variables that account for these
                                                                                                                                                                            
14 The data used are in dollars and correspond in the majority of the cases to the year 2000. For some
countries the information is not available for the year 2000. In these cases, the latest information is used
and adjusted by the inflation.
15 The software used is FRONTIER 4.1. 
16 Multicolinearity is not a problem for DEA as for regression analysis. In contrast, according to Pedraja
Chaparro et al (1999), the loss of performance of DEA due to an increased number of variables, is reduced
when these variables are correlated. 
17 The software used is DEAP 2.1. 
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effects. The model estimated is a Tobit (limited dependent variable) because the
efficiency scores are censored18. The model estimated is: 
ii eOCDDDes ++++++= 15143312010 αααααα
where es is the efficiency score (assuming CRS) obtained from DEA and the dummy
variables are defined as above.
6 Results
6.1 Analysis of ratios
 
Ratio analysis yields a preliminary view of the firms’ performance before a more
comprehensive measure of efficiency is used19. I compute three ratios: cost per consumer,
cost per line and lines per consumer. Descriptive statistics such as the mean, the standard
deviation, the maximum and minimum are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Ratios
cost per consumer 54 177 88 477 83
cost per line 54 3952 3519 18963 587
lines per consumer 54 82 73 350 11
Ratios Samplesize Mean
Standard
deviation Maximum Minimum
In addition, a ranking is performed in order to compare the firms’ performance. The
rankings in ascending order are presented in Table 2. 
                                                          
18 The efficiency scores are censored so that they cannot exceed one.
19 Ratio analysis has several drawbacks. First, it does not consider the differences in the operating
environments that exist between the distribution companies. Second, there are a large number of potential
unit cost or other ratios and the result might be different according with which ratio is employed. If a firm
uses several inputs to produce several outputs, these ratios do not seem to be good indicators of
performance.
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Table 2. Rankings by cost per consumer, lines per consumer and cost per line
1 Peru - ELN 82,9 Argentina - EDESUR 11,1 Australia - Great Southern Energy 586,5
2 Peru - ENOSA 90,0 Bolivia - Electropaz 11,3 Australia - Advance Energy 597,5
3 N Zealand - Dunedin 95,6 UK - London 15,0 Australia - NorthPower 690,7
4 Bolivia - Electropaz 98,0 Peru - ELN 17,1 N Zealand - Network Waitaki 734,2
5 UK - Eastern 98,3 Chile - CONAFE 19,3 N Zealand - Centralines 745,7
6 Australia - Energy Australia 104,6 Peru - ENOSA 20,0 N Zealand - The Lines Co. 754,4
7 UK - Seeboard 104,9 UK - Seeboard 21,1 N Zealand - Top Energy 875,4
8 UK - Southern 106,5 Brasil - CEB 21,9 N Zealand - Alpine Energy 982,5
9 N Zealand - Waipa Power 109,9 Colombia - CODENSA 22,0 N Zealand - Waipa Power 1155,8
10 Chile - CONAFE 113,9 Peru - LDS 24,3 N Zealand - Northpower 1186,8
cost per consumer lines per consumer cost per line
Cost per consumer is an indicator of the performance of the firm. But it is a partial
measure of performance because other variables which may affect the performance are
not considered. For instance, consumers’ dispersion is not accounted for in this ratio. A
high dispersion indicates higher costs per consumer while little dispersion implies smaller
costs per consumer. 20 The dispersion is captured in the ratio lines per consumer. Indeed,
many of the firms which appear as most efficient according to the cost per consumer ratio
(ELN, ENOSA, Electropaz, Seeboard, CONAFE) are favoured by a higher concentration
of consumers. In order to account for the effect of dispersion in the computation of a unit
cost, the ratio cost per line is calculated. The ratio cost per line favours the firms with a
higher network length. Firms which appear with the smallest cost per line are among the
firms with higher lines per consumer. Thus, this ratio is capturing the dispersion of the
consumers to a certain degree. 
6.2 Ordinary least squares 
First, it is important to verify that the regression equations are statistically valid and
consistent with economic intuitions. The results for the log-linear specifications are
presented in Table 3.
                                                          
20 As well as consumer dispersion other characteristics of the area supplied, which are outside the control of
the manager, such as topology, climate, etc. influence the performance of the firm. 
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OLS - 1LL OLS - 2LL OLS - 3LL OLS - 4LL
intercept 4.77 (8.95) -4.65 (-6.54) -3.79 (-10.18) 5.03 (27.5)
lconsumers 0.85 (13.10)
llines 0.12 (1.36) 0.23 (1.41)
lenergy 0.79 (6.19) 0.95 (20.12)
ladcons 1.02 (30.95)
adjusted R2 0.95 0.88 0.88 0.95
F 554.49 207.26 404.78 957.82
DW 1.87 0.67 0.67 1.50
dependant variable: lcosts
Table 3. OLS results (t statistics in parenthesis)
In each case the coefficients have the expected signs. All the variables are significant
except llines. The statistics (adjusted R squared and F) indicate that the models are good.
Models OLS–2LL and OLS–3LL are discarded because the Durbin Watson indicates that
we reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the residuals. Models OLS–1LL and
OLS–4LL are well behaved. Two general heteroscedasticity tests (White and Breusch-
Pagan) are performed, concluding that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
homoscedasticity of the residuals. 
The log-linear specification is preferred to a linear specification for two reasons: i) it
facilitates the interpretation of the coefficients (i.e. coefficients can be interpreted as
elasticities) and ii) some heteroscedasticity problems are detected in the estimation in
levels, which are absent in the log-linear specification.
In addition, when the log-linear model is estimated using energy as cost driver we find
autocorrelation problems. Therefore, the preferred specifications are the log-linear
specification with consumers and lines as cost drivers (OLS–1LL) and the log-linear
specification with the composite output (OLS–4LL).
The efficiency scores are calculated for the two preferred specifications in order to
compare the relative efficiency of the firms. The efficiency score is calculated
as: ( ) tpredictedtpredictedtobserved coscoscos − ). A firm with a negative score
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represents a firm with an efficiency greater than the average efficiency (the observed cost
is lower than the average efficient cost). Annex C presents the efficiency scores and the
rankings for the model with two outputs (OLS–1LL) and with the composite output
(OLS–4LL). 
6.2.1 Effect of regulation, competition and ownership
The effects of regulation, competition and ownership are evaluated including dummy
variables in the two preferred specifications. The results obtained are presented in the
Table 4.
OLS - 5LL OLS - 6LL OLS - 7LL OLS - 8LL
intercept 4.68 (6.53) 5.65 (16.05) 4.04 (7.08) 5.16 (25.37)
lconsumers 0.72 (9.19) 0.75 (10.04)
llines 0.22 (2.07) 0.25 (2.52)
ladcons 0.97 (16.02) 1.01 (34.91)
D0 -0.03 (-0.1) -0.11 (-0.42) 
D1 -0.6 (-2.16) -0.63 (-2.39)
D3 -0.46 (-2.75) -0.52 (-3.27)
C1 0.03 (0.16) -0.13 (-0.73) -0.28 (-1.83) -0.45 (-3.45)
O1 0.3 (2.48) 0.33 (2.98) 0.33 (2.67) 0.37 (3.28)
adjusted R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
F 199.89 250.66 310.45 422.47
DW 2.26 2.33 2.06 2.10
dependant variable: lcosts
Table 4. Effects of regulation, competition and ownership (t statistics in 
parenthesis)
Observing the performance of models OLS-5LL and OLS–6LL, the coefficients have the
expected signs and the statistics indicate that the models are good. Regarding the effect of
the regulatory method, I find that the absence of regulation has no significant effect on
cost level (D0). I find that the use of benchmarking techniques has the effect of reducing
costs (D3 negative and significant). This result agrees with the theoretical literature:
strongest regulatory incentives imply lower costs. I find that D1 is significant and has a
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negative sign implying that the firms which do not receive regulatory incentives but have
to comply with competition law have lower costs. Regarding competition, I find that the
existence of competition at the distribution level has no significant effect on cost level
(C1 not significant). Finally, regarding ownership effect, the dummy O1 has a significant
positive sign. This implies that private firms present higher costs. Although this result
disagrees with the theoretical literature, it is in accordance with the previous empirical
findings. Indeed, the previous empirical studies do not find evidence supporting the
allegation that private firms are more efficient than public enterprises.  
Both equations are estimated excluding the dummy variables D in order to assess the
effect of competition and ownership separately and to see whether the non-significance of
C1 is robust. Models OLS–7LL (two outputs) and OLS–8LL (aggregate output) are well
behaved. Regarding the effect of competition, I find that competition at the distribution
level results in lower costs (C1 negative and significant)21. The variable O1 presents a
positive sign, implying a positive relationship between private ownership and firms’
costs. 
6.3 Stochastic Frontier Analysis
The results obtained are presented in the Table 5.
                                                          
21 Since the t-ratios of the variables C increase with the omission of the variables D, the correlation of these
variables is studied. It is important to indicate that the correlation is not high.  In particular, the correlation
between C1 (competition) and D1 (competition policy) is 0.40. Thus, it does not seem to be
multicolinearity problems. 
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SFA-1LL SFA-2LL SFA-1TL
intercept 1 -7.56 (-10.3) -6.29 (-6.69) -8.58 (-4.69)
lconsumers 0.83 (18.03) 0.89 (3.36)
llines 0.27 (4.32) 0.02 (0.05)
ladcons 1.07 (28.99)
lw 0.43 (4.99) 0.42 (3.27) 1.18 (1.93)
cc 0.08 (6.68)
ll 0.11 (3.03)
ww -0.01 (-0.41)
cl -0.17 (-5.38)
cw 0.11 (7.10)
wl -0.13 (-3.63)
intercept 2 0.81 (1.62) 1.13 (2.64) 0.23 (0.45)
D0 -0.07 (-1.43) -0.11 (-0.29) 0.42 (0.62)
D1 -0.41 (-1.12) -0.61 (-2.07) -0.43 (-1.53)
D3 -0.71 (-2.21) -0.62 (-2.55) -0.79 (-2.39)
C1 -0.67 (-1.79) -0.63 (-2.08) -0.67 (-2.35)
O1 0.69 (2.00) 0.60 (2.62) 1.04 (3.67)
Table 5. SFA results (t statistics in parenthesis)
dependant variable: lcosts
Observing model SFA–1LL, I find that the use of benchmarking techniques has the effect
of reducing costs (D3 negative and significant). I find a positive relationship between
private ownership and cost level (O1 significant and positive). In model SFA–2LL, both
D1 and D3 present negative significant signs, which implies that the use of benchmarking
techniques and the use of competition law have the effect of reducing costs. I find that
competition at the distribution level has the effect of reducing costs (C1 negative and
significant). O1 is positive and significant, implying a positive relationship between
private firms and costs. 
For the translog specification with two outputs (SFA–1TL), cc is the square of
lconsumers , ll is the square of llines, ww is the square of lw , cl is the product of
lconsumers  per llines , cw is the product of lconsumers  per lw and wl is the product of
lw per llines . The variables consumers and wages result significant and have the
expected sign. The variable lines is not significant. Regarding the firm-specific effects, I
find that the use of benchmarking techniques has the expected effect (D3 significant and
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negative). I find that competition at the distribution level has the effect of reducing costs
(C1 significant and negative). O1 is statistically significant and has a positive sign,
implying that private ownership is related with higher costs. The translog specification
with the composite output is rejected because the labour cost presents a negative sign. 
The computer programme calculates predictions of individual firm technical efficiencies.
In the case of a cost frontier, the technical efficiency score takes a value between one and
infinity. A coefficient equal to 1 means that the firm is efficient. The efficiency scores
obtained for the translog specification with two outputs (SFA–1TL) are presented in
Annex C. According to these results, six firms are on the frontier (Dunedin, The Lines
Co., Energy Australia, Great Southern Energy, Eastern and Seeboard). 
6.4 Data Envelopment Analysis
Table D-2 in Annex C presents the efficiency scores and the average efficiency obtained
assuming CRS and VRS. According to the CRS DEA there are five firms on the frontier
(Dunedin, Network Waitaki, ELN, Great Southern Energy and Advance Energy). The
results show a considerable variation in efficiency scores ranging from 21% to 100%.
The mean of the efficiency scores is 68.5%. CEB appears as the least efficient firm. The
score obtained (0.21) indicates that the firm must reduce 79% its inputs to achieve the
frontier.
When VRS are assumed, the number of firms on the frontier increases from five to nine.
The same firms identified as efficient with CRS are still on the frontier. In addition,
Centralines, Energy Australia, NorthPower (Australia) and Eastern are on the frontier
with VRS. The mean of the efficiency scores increases to 73%. CEB appears again as the
least efficient firm but it must reduce 77% its inputs to achieve the frontier. The
difference in the inefficiency is explained by scale inefficiency. 
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6.4.1 Two-stage DEA
The results obtained are:
)60.3()22.0()67.2()79.1()79.0()89.6(
124.0102.0325.0118.0012.068.0
−−
−+++−= OCDDDesi
The estimated slope coefficients may differ from the marginal effects. The marginal
effects are calculated, obtaining:
)61.3()22.0()66.2()79.1()79.0()07.7(
123.0102.0324.0117.0011.064.0
−−
−+++−= OCDDDesi
The sign of the coefficient indicates whether the variable increases or decreases
efficiency. The results indicate a positive relationship between the strongest regulatory
incentives (benchmarking techniques measured through D3) and efficiency levels. I also
find a positive relationship between the application of competition law and efficiency
levels. Regarding ownership effect, I find a negative relationship between private capital
(O1) and efficiency levels. The signs of the variables D0 and C1 are the expected but they
are not statistically significant. 
6.4.2 Program evaluation
Program evaluation is used within DEA efficiency evaluation framework to identify
differences in performance that can be attributed to the association of the firm with a
particular group or program. In the present study this technique is used to evaluate the
existence of efficiency differences between public and private firms. Following Brockett
and Galony (1996), the Mann-Withney rank test is used. The statistic obtained is 5.30.
Therefore, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the two programs (public and private
firms) have the same distribution of efficiency scores at a significance level of 5%. This
result agrees with Pollitt´s (1995) finding. The author finds that the public firms perform
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better than the private companies with the DEA estimation but he cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no difference between both ownership types. 
6.5 Consistency of the results
It is important to evaluate the existence of consistency between the results obtained with
the different approaches. Following Rossi and Ruzzier (2001), the consistency conditions
between the frontier techniques (SFA, CRS DEA and VRS DEA) are evaluated22. The
correlation between rankings by each approach and the correlation between rankings by
other performance measures (cost per line, per consumer and OLS estimation) are
calculated. In addition, the correlation between rankings of best and worst firms is
calculated. In summary, the analysis performed indicates that the techniques employed
are consistent in their rankings, in the identification of most and least efficient firms and
with other measures of performance. 
7 Conclusion 
In summary, the present study analysed the performance of electricity distribution firms,
measuring the relative efficiency through an international comparison. The techniques
employed include calculation of partial productivity measures, the traditional OLS
estimation and the relatively new SFA and DEA approaches. A consistency analysis was
performed, which indicates the robustness of the results regarding the technique used. 
According to the three approaches (SFA, CRS DEA and VRS DEA) the frontier is
dominated by small firms, mainly small New Zealand and Australian firms. The results
agree with Jamasb and Pollitt (2001), who observe in a study of European countries in
1997-98, that the efficient frontiers tend to be dominated by firms smaller than the UK
firms. Besides the predominance of small firms, two large UK firms (Eastern and
                                                          
22 The consistency conditions are proposed by Bauer et al (1998). 
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Seebord) are on the frontier according to the present study. This difference can be due to
a change of the relative efficiencies over time or to the different sample used. 
The main contribution of the present study is the assessment of the influence of the
regulatory method, the firm’s public or private ownership and the conditions of
competition on the productive efficiency of the firms. This is the first attempt to do this.
There are no previous empirical studies which evaluate the effect of these three
characteristics on efficiency. The inclusion of the three characteristics together allows
isolating the effects. The theoretical literature suggests, first, that firms which operate in a
competitive environment (i.e. they have to compete for customers) are more productively
efficient than firms which have captive customers. Second, that private firms are
relatively more efficient than public companies. Third, that among the regulatory
methods, the use of yardstick competition or benchmarking techniques gives the strongest
incentives to the firms to be efficient.
With regards to the effect of competition, the results obtained in the present study
confirm the view that a higher competition is related with lower costs. Firms which
operate in a competitive environment are more productively efficient than firms which
have captive customers.
Regarding the influence of the regulatory method, it is crucial to note the finding of a
negative significant relationship between the strongest regulatory incentives (given by the
use of yardstick competition or benchmarking techniques) and firms’ costs, confirming
the view of the theoretical literature. In addition, the present study finds a negative
significant relationship between the use of competition policy and firm’s costs. In the
sample considered, New Zealand is the country where competition law is applied. At the
same time New Zealand firms receive pressures from competition. This result agrees with
the tendency towards reducing the regulatory intervention, relying more on competition
law, as competition develops. As suggests the literature and confirm the empirical
findings, competition improves productive efficiency, and thus, this may reduce the need
for regulation. 
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Finally, concerning the effect of ownership, we do not find evidence that private firms are
more efficient than public companies. A positive significant relationship between private
firms and costs is found. This result is in accordance with the previous empirical studies,
which do not find evidence of a higher efficiency of the private firms. However,
according to the Mann-Withney rank test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
public and private firms have the same distribution of efficiency scores. 
According to the theoretical literature, the firms which we should expect to be most
inefficient are Ande (Paraguay), Ute (Uruguay) and Enelven (Venezuela) because they
are unregulated public firms without competitive pressures at the distribution level.
Observing the results obtained Enelven and UTE are identified as inefficient by the three
techniques. Yet, Ande is less inefficient than expected. According to CRS DEA, Ande
could reduce its inputs 23.3% but according to SFA it is very close to the frontier. This
result may be explained by the omission of the quality of the service in the analysis. A
public firm with no regulation and no competition may provide a poor service and thus
incur in fewer costs, appearing as more efficient. 
 
The study should be enhanced in some aspects. First, the last paragraph suggests that a
further improvement to the present study would be the incorporation of a measure of
quality of the service. The inclusion of this variable would be crucial since there is a
trade-off between improving quality and reducing costs. Second, the issue of
comparability of data is very important in an international comparison. Different data
accountability in countries may influence the results. In order to benefit from this kind of
comparison studies, coordination and cooperation between regulators to collect, exchange
and make data comparable across countries is vital. Related with the availability of data,
the possibility of increasing the sample size would improve the robustness of the results
derived from the present study. Finally, the study could be improved by considering the
development of unregulated activities by the firms and the effect of this on efficiency.    
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Annex A
Analysis of data 
Graph 1 presents the relationship between operating costs (adjusted by PPP) and
consumers when the whole sample is considered. It is possible to observe that all the
firms are grouped together except two firms, which are much bigger than the rest. These
are a Mexican firm (CFE) and a Brazilian firm (CEMIG).  
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Graph 2 shows the relationship between operating costs (adjusted by PPP) and consumers
when these two firms are excluded from the sample. In this graph we can observe a
positive relationship between costs and consumers and the dispersion of the firms is not
too large.
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1 N Zealand - Alpine Energy x x x
2 N Zealand - Buller Electricity x x x
3 N Zealand - Hawke's Bay Network x x x
4 N Zealand - CentralPower x x x
5 N Zealand - Dunedin Electricity x x x
6 N Zealand - Horizon Energy Dist. x x x
7 N Zealand - Powerco x x x
8 N Zealand - Orion x x x
9 N Zealand - Marlborough Lines x x x
10 N Zealand - MainPower x x x
11 N Zealand - Counties Power x x x
12 N Zealand - Centralines x x x
13 N Zealand - Eastland Network x x x
14 N Zealand - Electricity Ashburton x x x
15 N Zealand - Network Waitaki x x x
16 N Zealand - Electricity Invercargill x x x
17 N Zealand - Northpower x x x
18 N Zealand - The Lines Company x x x
19 N Zealand - Westpower x x x
20 N Zealand - Waipa Power x x x
21 N Zealand - Top Energy x x x
22 N Zealand - Vector x x x
23 Argentina - EDESUR x x x
24 Argentina - EDEERSA x x x
25 Bolivia - CRE x x x
26 Bolivia - Electropaz x x x
27 Brazil - CEB x x x
28 Brazil - COSERN x x x
29 Chile - CONAFE x x x
30 Paraguay ANDE x x x
31 Uruguay - UTE x x x
32 Peru - ELN x x x
33 Peru - ENOSA x x x
34 Peru - LDS x x x
35 Colombia - CODENSA x x x
36 Venezuela - ENELVEN x x x
37 Australia - Energy Australia x x x
38 Australia - Integral Energy x x x
39 Australia - NorthPower x x x
40 Australia - Great Southern Energy x x x
41 Australia - Advance Energy x x x
42 UK - South Western x x x
43 UK - Eastern x x x
44 UK - Norweb x x x
45 UK - Northern x x x
46 UK - ScottishPower x x x
47 UK - Hydro-Electric x x x
48 UK - Midlands x x x
49 UK - Seeboard x x x
50 UK - Yorkshire x x x
51 UK - Southern x x x
52 UK - Manweb x x x
53 UK - London x x x
54 UK - East Midlands x x x
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Firms
  Table B-1    Firms´ classification according to competition, ownership and regulatory method
D0 D1 D2 D3C0 C1 O0 O1
1 N Zealand - Alpine Energy -0,05 6 -0,06 4
2 N Zealand - Buller Electricity 0,10 53 0,09 52
3 N Zealand - Hawke's Bay Network -0,01 27 0,00 28
4 N Zealand - CentralPower -0,03 11 -0,03 13
5 N Zealand - Dunedin Electricity -0,06 4 -0,06 2
6 N Zealand - Horizon Energy Dist. -0,11 1 -0,03 15
7 N Zealand - Powerco -0,02 21 -0,02 18
8 N Zealand - Orion -0,03 13 -0,04 12
9 N Zealand - Marlborough Lines 0,11 54 0,11 53
10 N Zealand - MainPower 0,06 49 0,05 48
11 N Zealand - Counties Power 0,02 41 0,03 41
12 N Zealand - Centralines -0,04 9 -0,05 6
13 N Zealand - Eastland Network 0,03 42 0,03 40
14 N Zealand - Electricity Ashburton 0,04 47 0,02 37
15 N Zealand - Network Waitaki -0,07 2 -0,07 1
16 N Zealand - Electricity Invercargill -0,04 8 -0,03 16
17 N Zealand - Northpower -0,03 12 -0,04 10
18 N Zealand - The Lines Company -0,04 10 -0,05 8
19 N Zealand - Westpower 0,07 50 0,06 49
20 N Zealand - Waipa Power -0,06 3 -0,06 3
21 N Zealand - Top Energy -0,02 17 -0,03 14
22 N Zealand - Vector 0,04 45 0,03 39
23 Argentina - EDESUR 0,03 43 0,04 47
24 Argentina - EDEERSA 0,07 51 0,09 51
25 Bolivia - CRE 0,05 48 0,07 50
26 Bolivia - Electropaz -0,03 14 0,00 30
27 Brazil - CEB 0,10 52 0,11 54
28 Brazil - COSERN -0,01 25 0,00 34
29 Chile - CONAFE -0,02 19 0,00 36
30 Paraguay ANDE -0,02 22 -0,01 23
31 Uruguay - UTE 0,02 38 0,03 38
32 Peru - ELN -0,05 5 -0,02 21
33 Peru - ENOSA -0,05 7 -0,01 24
34 Peru - LDS 0,02 40 0,04 46
35 Colombia - CODENSA 0,02 39 0,03 44
36 Venezuela - ENELVEN 0,04 46 0,03 42
37 Australia - Energy Australia -0,03 15 -0,04 11
38 Australia - Integral Energy 0,00 30 -0,02 22
39 Australia - NorthPower -0,02 18 -0,04 9
40 Australia - Great Southern Energy -0,02 20 -0,05 5
41 Australia - Advance Energy 0,00 35 -0,05 7
42 UK - South Western 0,00 34 0,03 45
43 UK - Eastern -0,02 16 -0,03 17
44 UK - Norweb 0,00 29 0,00 29
45 UK - Northern 0,02 37 0,00 35
46 UK - ScottishPower 0,00 33 0,00 32
47 UK - Hydro-Electric 0,04 44 0,03 43
48 UK - Midlands 0,00 32 0,00 27
49 UK - Seeboard -0,02 24 -0,02 20
50 UK - Yorkshire -0,01 26 -0,01 26
51 UK - Southern -0,02 23 -0,02 19
52 UK - Manweb 0,00 31 0,00 31
53 UK - London 0,01 36 0,00 33
54 UK - East Midlands -0,01 28 -0,01 25
Company OLS-1LL OLS-4LL
Ordinary Least Squares
Annex C
Ranking
Table C-1. Efficiency scores by OLS-1LL and by OLS-4LL
Efficiency score Ranking Efficiency score 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis and Data Envelopment Analysis
Efficiency score Ranking Efficiency score Ranking Efficiency score Ranking
1 N Zealand - Alpine Energy 1,03 8 0,959 7 0,970 10
2 N Zealand - Buller Electricity 3,45 50 0,349 50 0,662 37
3 N Zealand - Hawke's Bay Network 1,35 23 0,601 37 0,603 38
4 N Zealand - CentralPower 1,25 20 0,772 22 0,783 25
5 N Zealand - Dunedin Electricity 1,00 1 1,000 1 1,000 1
6 N Zealand - Horizon Energy Dist. 1,53 30 0,858 16 0,914 16
7 N Zealand - Powerco 1,08 11 0,740 26 0,765 28
8 N Zealand - Orion 1,09 12 0,805 19 0,871 19
9 N Zealand - Marlborough Lines 3,81 51 0,238 53 0,242 53
10 N Zealand - MainPower 2,95 47 0,365 49 0,369 50
11 N Zealand - Counties Power 2,27 43 0,463 43 0,468 45
12 N Zealand - Centralines 1,16 17 0,866 13 1,000 2
13 N Zealand - Eastland Network 2,20 42 0,471 42 0,481 44
14 N Zealand - Electricity Ashburton 2,16 41 0,518 38 0,531 42
15 N Zealand - Network Waitaki 1,07 10 1,000 2 1,000 3
16 N Zealand - Electricity Invercargill 1,09 13 0,778 21 0,909 17
17 N Zealand - Northpower 1,43 27 0,860 14 0,864 21
18 N Zealand - The Lines Company 1,00 2 0,896 12 0,906 18
19 N Zealand - Westpower 3,05 48 0,380 48 0,390 49
20 N Zealand - Waipa Power 1,09 14 0,936 9 0,968 11
21 N Zealand - Top Energy 1,13 15 0,780 20 0,791 23
22 N Zealand - Vector 1,89 39 0,460 44 0,465 46
23 Argentina - EDESUR 2,14 40 0,460 45 0,519 43
24 Argentina - EDEERSA 3,40 49 0,283 52 0,299 52
25 Bolivia - CRE 3,81 52 0,343 51 0,358 51
26 Bolivia - Electropaz 1,74 37 0,860 15 0,921 15
27 Brazil - CEB 6,04 54 0,210 54 0,227 54
28 Brazil - COSERN 1,56 31 0,706 29 0,790 24
29 Chile - CONAFE 1,61 34 0,751 25 0,753 29
30 Paraguay ANDE 1,03 9 0,767 24 0,865 20
31 Uruguay - UTE 2,28 44 0,501 40 0,568 40
32 Peru - ELN 1,46 28 1,000 3 1,000 4
33 Peru - ENOSA 1,40 25 0,929 10 0,954 12
34 Peru - LDS 2,83 46 0,485 41 0,536 41
35 Colombia - CODENSA 1,72 36 0,508 39 0,585 39
36 Venezuela - ENELVEN 3,94 53 0,416 46 0,447 48
37 Australia - Energy Australia 1,00 3 0,990 6 1,000 5
38 Australia - Integral Energy 1,56 32 0,771 23 0,781 26
39 Australia - NorthPower 1,01 7 0,940 8 1,000 6
40 Australia - Great Southern Energy 1,00 4 1,000 4 1,000 7
41 Australia - Advance Energy 1,46 29 1,000 5 1,000 8
42 UK - South Western 1,82 38 0,608 36 0,674 36
43 UK - Eastern 1,00 5 0,913 11 1,000 9
44 UK - Norweb 1,22 19 0,677 30 0,738 30
45 UK - Northern 1,58 33 0,627 34 0,689 35
46 UK - ScottishPower 1,31 22 0,625 35 0,690 34
47 UK - Hydro-Electric 2,64 45 0,404 47 0,453 47
48 UK - Midlands 1,41 26 0,675 31 0,736 31
49 UK - Seeboard 1,00 6 0,848 18 0,933 13
50 UK - Yorkshire 1,21 18 0,729 27 0,796 22
51 UK - Southern 1,15 16 0,851 17 0,929 14
52 UK - Manweb 1,62 35 0,646 33 0,711 33
53 UK - London 1,38 24 0,667 32 0,727 32
54 UK - East Midlands 1,26 21 0,712 28 0,777 27
Table C-2. Efficiency scores and rankings
SFA -1TL DEA CRS DEA VRS
Company
